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I n t r o d u c t i o n.
0 ---
It frequently happens during the i,,any and rapid
transactions of business, hat two or more persons in
good faith, acquire equal rights in the same subject
matter, and courts are called upon to decide wihich shall
have the priority, and which shall bear the loss.
These two old and well settled maxims are cal led to
their aid ; "Where the equities are equal the law pro-
vails", and, "Where the equities are equal the first in
order of time prevails."
In the determination of these controversies the law
of notice plays a very important part. It is regarded
throurhout the rhiole range of jurisprudence, as a de-
cisive element in these controversies, whether the party
asking relief acted ,,ith or without notice of the claims
of others in or over tie same subject matter.
It is a well settled principle that a purchaser
with notice that the subject matter of the tansaction
is effected by some claim in favor of a prior third party,
takes subject to that claim. While on the oth) or hand
it is equally well settled, that, if he took without
notice, of any such preceeding claim he \ill be pro-
tected against such claim. Notice may be either act-
ual or constructive.
It is the purpose of this article to deail only with
the latter and its effect on the law of conveying real
es tate. The tenis used to define constructive notice
are many and varied as inplied, iputed, presumptive,
Chief Baron Eyre defines itand even actual notice.
thus, "constructive notice I take to be in its nature no
more than evidence of notice, the presumption being so
violent that the court will not allow it to be contra-
dicted." Judge Selden defines it as beinr, "A legal
inference from established facts, and ,ike other legal
presuiiptions does not admit of dispute." These and
many other similar expressions are the ones usually
adopted by judges and text-writers. Yet they seem to be
a littl e short of what seems to me the true theory. Is
not constructive notice, in its technical sense rather,
"The legal cogmizance of a fact or facts, -,ihich the
law imputes to a party" 9 Therefore it has nothing to
do with actual knowledge, nor is it founded on any doc-
trine of evidence. It does not rest on any presumIption
The theory is not that the party is pre-of knowl ede.
suned to know,but by intenmiont of law he does know,
that is, he stands as though he had actual knowledge.
These numerous definitions, together with an attempt
by many text-writers and judges to distinguish between
constructive and implied notice, tend to involve the
dostrine of notice in much confusion.
Story on his work on Equity at section 410 a makes
such a distinction, by placing notice by registaIy and
lis pendens as constructive, but notice by possession,
to agents, and other other similar classes he calls
ixpl ied notice.
Wade,in his work on notice, carries the same idea
to a limited extent. They give as the reason for the
distinction, that in the latter cases, the presoription
is one of fact and can be disputed. Ma ile on the other
hand, Pomroy , in his work on Equity,classes them all
as constructive noi-Ace. This seeis bo be + he best and
truest classifica tion.
Story and Wade, in their reasoning, seen to leave
out of consideration the fact that in what they term
implied notice, it is only the facts on which the notice
rests, that are open to dispute, and when once they are
proven to exist, the notice that the law raises is as
conclusive as in cases of record. In the latter cases
the fact of the existence of +he records, and whethe or
not the instrument was properly recorded, are open to
dispute. Therefore I claim they should both be placed i
in the swme class. When the facts are once established
and the relation of the parties is such as to bring them
within the operation of the law of constructive notice,
the notice itself presents a pure question of law for
the court to pass upon. Williamson vs. Brown, 15 N. Y.
5l9 ; Warden vs. Williams, 24 11. 67 ; Jones vs. Brain-
ford, 21 111. J. Eq. 217 , Roland vs. 11irt, 6 Ch. App.678.
Constructive notice seems to arrange itself into
the following classes or branches :
1st. Notice arising out of records. To this class
belongs tnie Registry law and Lis Pendens.
2nd. Notice arising from the parties' personal re-
lation to the transaction, such as possession by an
adverse claimant, and from title papers.
3rd. Notice arising out of the parties' constructive
relation to the transaction, as by agents or attorneys.
These will be treated in the order named.
Registry Laws.
In the case of Jackson vs. Burgot, 10 Johns. 461,
Ch. Kent said in effect, that the policy whjich applies
the doctrine of constructive notice to the registry of
of deed and other instruments, is to protect against
fraud. The policy arrived at being to accomplish
through constructive notice, the same results which would
be obtained thrott,(h actual notice. Hence these records
were to furnish a means whereby a purchaser or incum-
brancer could obtain reliable information, as to the
condition of his grantor's or mortgagor's title ; and
to give a g{rantee a chance to protect his title, by
placing it on record, against the subsequent acts of his
grantee or third persons. This is a matter never knoim
to the comnon law, and is regulated entirely by statute.
 a ws .
8In England there is no general registration act, but
for sertain local reasons there were passed as early as
the bemnning of the last century,statutes regulating
registration in certain counties. 2 & 3 Arnne Oh. 120,
8 Geo.II, Ch. G ; 6 Anne, Oh. 35.
These statutes were , in most cases, simply directi-
tory, and provided in substance that a memorial of all
conveyances may be recorded in a prescribed manner.
In some cases i'V was provided that such conveyances,
not recorded, should be void against a subsequent re-
corded conveyance. Nothing is said in any case of the
record ac-ing as notice to an, one. And the courts .
in constructing theri, have given them no such applica-
tion. Wayatt vs. Bradwell , 6 Ves. 4515 ; Jollant vs. S t :;
Stambridge, 3 Vest. 477.
9The reason why England did not pass registry law
can be accounted for, by their peculiar mode of convey-
ancing by livery of seizin, which was a public notor-
ious acts of which every body was supposed to take
notice. This can also be assigned as a reason for the
absence of recording, acts in the civil law of Rome.
Their formal conveyance by copper and scales was a public
act ; and later wnen done by simply delivery a man in
possession would be looked upon as the ower.
In the United States the legislatures and courts
have always favored the registration of instruments of
conveyance. Long before the Revolution,the. colonies of
Massachusetts and New York had passed registration acts.
In 1710 the colony of New York passed an act providing
for the recording of deeds, and in 1754 an act providing
for the registry of mortgages was passed.
among the first general registration acts passed. The y
were perpetuated by the Constitution of 1777, and ,vith
their various revisions, repeals, re-enactmrents, and
amendients have reil:aned in force to the present day.
Since these acts every state has passed similar acts.
In construing these various acts, the courts of the
various states differ with respect to the details. They
are, however, agreed that, if an instru~ient of convey-
ance or incumbrance be properly recorded, the record im-
parts constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or
incmnbrances, of the instrument and its contents, from
the time the original is left for record. Wade on
Notice, Ch. II, Part II ; Pomroy on 1,q. Jur. sec. 646.
They also practically agree that the instrument
These were
must be, first, an instrument effecting, either the legal
or equitable title to real estate. If the instritient
is void, the record is void. Second, such an instrument
as is a proper subject for record. Nothing car be
gained by recording an instrument which is not the proper
subject of record. Third, it must be properly recorded,
.In the sense that it must show that the statutes regulat-
ing execution, acknowledgment and so on have been com-
plied with. Parker vs. Hill, 8 I'etc.447 ; Washburn vs.
Burnham 63 1T. Y. 132 ; Zeigler vs. Shower, '78 Pa. St.3 57;
Pring le vs. Dun;., 37 Wis. 449 ; Galphin vs. Abbott,
6 iich. 17.
As to the extent that clerical errors or willful
misconduct of the recorder may effect the constructive
notice the authorities are in conflict. Some courts
hold that if the instruent be left with the proper
officer, and it has in itself all the requisites to en-
title it to a valid registry that grantee or mortgagee
has done all in his power and shall not be held by reason
of the omissions or mistakes of the recorder. Franklin
vs. Cannon I Root (Conn.) 580 ; Merrich vs. Wallace
19, III. 486 ; Nichols vs. Rengolds, 1 R.I. 30.
Other courts hold that the subsequent purchaser or
incutmbrancer is only to be conclusively notified of what
the record actually recites. In other words he need
not go back to see if the instruments were properly
spread on the record books. Barnard vs. Chapmjn, 29
Iiich. 162 ; Pringle vs. Dunn. Supra.; Jenninggs vs. Wood
2 Ohio, 261 ; Frost vs. Beeohiian, 18 Johns. 544; Dey vs.
Dunham,2 Johns. Ch.413. These two last cases are ]ead-
ing cases on this subject.
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In the Dey case a deed absolute on its face, but intended
for a mortgage, was recorded as a mort gaffe held to impart
no not, ice as a mortgage.
In the Frost case a mortgage for $3,000. was record-
ed as one for $300. held tat it was notice only to the
extent of $300. This seems like a hard rule that a grantee
is to be held for the acts or misconduct of an officer
over whom he has no control. True he has a remedy against
the officer, but inmany cases this is vastly inadequate.
But the courts say these statutes are in derrogation
of cojmmon law rights, and must be strictly construed.
Our registry officers are simply ministerial and may
record any instrtunent left for record, but nothing. can
be gPained by recording an improper instrument. Where
the conveyance is involuntary, as by a sheriff's deed,
the whole proceedings is in derrogation of the comnon
law ript6 and is provided for by statute. There f ore
the whole of the statute must be complied with, and
equi ty will not aid +,he execution of such powers.
Demning, vs. Smith, 3 John. Ch. :344; Atkins vs. Kennell,
20 Wend. 241.
Another important consideration is that the record
of conveyance is only notice to subsequent parties claim-
irg, under or throuvh the same grantor, by whom the re-
corded conveyance was executed.
A recorded conveyance from one straner to the
title to another stranger will not effect a party who
claims under a different grantor. Huthington vs. Clark,
30 Pa. St. 393 : Page vs. Waring, 7( '. Y. 463 ; Losey
vs. Simpson, 11 N. J. Eq. 24,9.
In the latter case the Chancellor say'ing, "When one
link in the chain of title is wanting, there is nothing
to guide the purchaser to the next succeediar link by
which the title is continued. When he traces down to
an individual, out of whom the title is not carried by
the record the registry acts makes that title the piir-
chaser's protection."
The often quoted expression that the record is
notice to the world is as erroneous as it is misleading.
The true rule is that it is notice only to subsequent
parties claiming under the same grantor. Some statutes
add the words, in good faith and for a valuable consider-
ation, and where these do not appear in the statute they
have been added by the courts.
1,i s Pendens .
The doctrine of lis pendens is one of very early
origin. Lord Bacon, in one of 'As early ordinances, laid
down the rule, "No decree bindeth any that cometh in
bona fida, by conveyance from the defendant, before the
bill is exhibited, and is made no party by bill or order;
but when he cometh in pendente lite, and while the suit
is in full prosecution, and without any color or privity
of coult, then regularly the decree bindeth. But, if
there were any intermissions of suit, or the court is
made acquainted witi the conveyance, the court is to
give order according to justice." Bacon's Works, Vol.
II, 479.
Chancellor Kent, in the case of lurray vs. Bellow,
1 John. Ch., thinks this one of the earliest promulga-
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tions of the rule, and adds that it has been full,, sup-
ported down to the present time. The foundation of the
rule seems to be the prevention of litigation. There
is a difference of opinion amoi text-,,writer and judges
as to whether it operates by reason off the doctrine of
constructive notice or by reason of the piblicity of
courts and their proceeding , together with the fact that
the lavi will not allow the parties pending the litiga-
tion to give other parties rights to the property in
dispute, so as to prejudice the other. This latter
doctrine is advocated by Dight C. in the case of
Hobrook vs. 1T. J. Zinck Co. 57 U. Y. , and by Lord Cran-
worth in case of Bellemy vs. Sabine, I De G. & J. 566.
While on the other hand, Story, Wade, Kent and
other writers apply the doctrine strictly on the ground
of notice. The courts and mariy of the statutes on the
subject apply it with the sane effects as constructive
notice. At coji.nnn law the doctrine seemed to be that, if
after the filing of the bill and issuimn, of the subpoena,
a person purchased the property from one of the litigants
it would be bound by the decree of the court. A f ter
the establishment of registry laws and under the reform
proce dure acts, the whole doctrine has been chand and
made s tatutory.
In New York the eourt of Civil Procedure sec. 1670-
1675 provides for the filing of a notice of ]is pendens
in the Bounty Clerk's office.
cerninp: real estate. The pla
The suit must be one con-
intiff may, on filing his
complaint, file with it a notice as prescribed by law.
This notice shall be recorded and will ac± as construct-
ive notice to purchaser or incuilbrancer of the property,
durir the litigation.In most if not all of the states
the doctrine of lis pendens has become a pure matter of
statute, which if followred, Hive the same result as at
comlon law. The doctrine in its technical coimmon law
sense was a harsh one and one not favored by the courts.
In the case of Leitch vs. Wells, 48 8.Y. 585- Earl C. in
coimenting on the doctrine said,"It has always been con-
sidered a hard rule and will be applied only when the
case is actually brought within it, and if a slip is made
in the proceeding, the court will not aid in rectifying
the jistake. Hard and unjust as the rule may at times
seem, if constructive notice were not applied there would
be no certainty that litigation would ever cease. It is
from the consideration of public policy, as well as the
protection of the rights of the parties themselves that
the law charges a party witli notice by a record to the
same extent and with the same consequences as though he
had actual knowledge.
Notice by Possession.
The general rule is well settled both in this coun-
tr and En~land that open, notorious, and exclusive
possession of real estate is constructive notice to those
dealing subsequently with the estate, of the interest of
the one in possession, whether such interest be legal or
equitable.
The leading English case on this subject is that of
Taylor vs. Stebbert, 2 Ves. 437, decided in 1794 by
Lord Rosslyn, and followed by the case of Holmes vs.
Powell, 8 De G. 1i. & G. 72, where the rule was clearly
and accurately stated by J. C. Knight-Bruce in the fol-
lowing language : "I apprehend that by the law of England,
when a man is of right and de facto in possession of a
corporeal heriditiment, he is entitled to impute knowl-
edie of thct possession to all who del for any interest
in the property conf] icting or inconsistant ,iith the
title or alleged title under which he is in possession
or has a right to couple with his possession".
The case of Brown vs. Volkeninc 64 U. Y. 76 states
the rule as applied in this country substantial] y as it
is applied in England. The English courts say that the
possession must be open, visible, notorious, and under a
claim of right or ownlership.
In the cases of this country, the adjectives used
are about the same, or at least of the same import. A
fair sample are those used in the case of Brown vs. Vol-
keninF, supra. Tfich are, "that the possession must be
actual open, visible and inconsistant wi th the record
of the apparent owner by the records ; not equivocal,
occasional, nor for a special or temporary purpose. )on-
structive possession is not enough."
As to the possession of a tenant of the vrantor,
there is a diversity of opinion in the country. In
Erland it seems well settled that it is sinply notice
of the tenancy ; that is, it is notice only of the inter-
est or title of the actual accupant. Barnhart vs.
Greenshield, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 77; 2 Sug. on Vendors,
sec. 762 -3 ; Wade on notice p. 121.
In New York the clear weight of authoritr is -hat
a
the possession must be actual. Brown vs. Volkening. In
that case a key to unfinished dwell ing houses was de-
livered to the purchaser, and it was held not to be such
a delivery of possession as would give a bona fida in-
cumbrancer notice of the interest of the purchaser.
In California possession by a tenant is held to be
notice even of the land-lord's title.
In Hodgin's Executors vs. Aminerman, 40 '7. J. Eq. 99,
it was held that actual residence on the land was not
necessary, but as in the case wh ere t)he land was used for
a meadow, and defendant had kept the lenses in repair,
he would be protected against the lien of a judgnent ren-
dered arainst his g rantor after the giving, but before
the recording of the deed.
In Fassett vs. Smith, 23 N. Y. 256, it was held that
the possession of +he wife's land by the husband was
sufficient to put the purchaser on enquire as to the
wife's title. These are fair samples of what the
courts hold to be sufficient possession to put subse-
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quent parties on enquire as to what the inferest of the
party in possession is.
In Iviassachusetts the statute declar,,s that nothing
but actual notice will suffice to invalidate a subse-
quent recorded conveyance, and that it cannot be pre-
suned from open and notorious possession, even when the
subsequent party had actual knowledge of the possession.
He can abide by the result of an examination of the
records. Sibleyr vs. Leffinvell, 8 Allen 584 ; Pomeroy
vs. Stevens, II Iietc. 244.
It appears to be well settled in England that
possession of a tenant is not only notice of the rirhts
and interests arising out of the tenancy, but is also
notice of subsequent rights acquired during the tenancy.
Danials vs. Davinson, 16 Ves. 249. In this case -'he
subsequent rig~ht was an w,)eementto purchase.
been extended to all persons in possession. Pmrn. Aq.
Jur. sec. 616. This is also the rule in NIew York.
Reed vs. Garron, 50 1i. Y. 345 ; Parker vs. Connor, 93
IT. Y. 118.
Yet there are courts which hold that possession
began under one right is not notice of any other sub-
sequent acquired ri! ,ht.
Taking the theory of this doctrine as established
by the best authority and the la+,er rule can not hold;
because possession is enoufgh to put one on enquire and
h\
he is bound by, what he discovers or iiot have discovered
by a diligent enquire.
'Chi s has
otice from Title Papers.
At the present t mne purchasers or incit,ibrancers
generally rely on the public records for information in
regard to titles. If from such records these appear
a connected chain of titles by a succession of deed from
the greneral government down to his granter, he can safe-
ly rest, unless he ('iscovers that there is an outstand-
ing equity in favor of some third person.
In Enpgland, when titles are conveyed by a long line
of title deeds, the absence of one is sufficient to put
him on enquire as to hy it is missing. It is an in-
dication of an outstanding interest secured by the absent
deed. This method of conveyancing and creating lines
is practically never used in this country ; yet Pomeroy
says the principle still exists and will be applied in
The most coJmuon wav of iTivirg noticeanalagous cases.
by title papers is by i'ecitals contained in them.
Whenever a purchase', or incumibrancer hold under a con-
veyance, and is obliged to make out his title by a series
of conveyances, the rule is well established that he has
constructive notice of all matters which appear, either
by recital, reference, or 6therwise, on the face of any
instrument necessary to make out his chain of title.
Such purchaser charged with notice in this manner,
of any trust, subject to which the legal title of his
grantor was held, takes subject to such trust and holds
as trustee for the beneficiary whose interest is dis-
closed by the title papers, or facts to which their re-
citals would load an enquirer of ordinary diligence.
Therefore, if a deed recites or refers to another
transaction in relation to the same subjlect mat Per, the
purchaser shall be deemed !o have cons truc tive notice of
such transaction. Oliver vs. Pratt, 3 How. 333 ;
Acer vs. Wescott, 46 1'. Y. 384 ; Cambridge vs. Delano,
48 N. Y. 384.
This doc t rine applies also where the facts recited
are in regard to equitable and not legal interest. Acer
vs. Wescott, 1 Lans. 193. It has been applied to
statutory conveyances, as a sale on execution. The
conveyance is declared to consist of the judgmient, levy,
sale, and sheriff's deed, each of which is an essential
requisite to a valid conveyance. Upon the val idicy
of these constituents the purchaser must depend for his
ti tl e.
In the case of Nelson vs. Allen, I Ya,- ( 'e) 360,
when the record of the decree was ex',)nned, it was found
that the judgpent was invalid for want of jurisdiction of
the court. The pr-chasers :.ere held charreable with
constructive notice of the above fact, as the decree was
part of his chain of title.
The lien of a vendor for pirchase price has always
been favored by the courts of qquity. They will en-
force it if the purchaser, by reference to the title
instruments of his grantor, might have learned that a
former conveyance was on credit.
enquire whether such has been paid.
Blackwell , 3 B. ,,on. 67. Thi s do
when the title is claimed througlh a will.
It is his duty to
Executors vs.
ctrine is often applied
In Farris vs.
ly, 7 Paige 421, a testator devised his land to a son
and grave his dauiter a legacy payable by the son.
The real estate was held to be incunbered by the legacy,
and a subsequent p;rchaser f,'om the son wai chargfed with
notice that the legacy had not been paid. The same
rule was applied in the case of i,'IcTeeter vs. i'jicullen,
2 Pa. St. -32 ; Bell as vs. Lloyd, 2 Watts 401.
It has been said that the recitals must be certa, in
and explicit, but the better rule sems to be that they
need only be reasonably clear. The courts say that is
certain which can be made certain. (Cases supra.) A
second mortgagee always has notice of a prior mortga(e
mentioned in his mortgagor's deed. Rake- vs. ,Iatthiews,
21 tich. l
As to the remoteness of a conveyance that will bind
a purchaser by its recitals, the rule seems to be that
he has constructive notice of all instruments in Miis
chain of title to which an examinaliion would lead.
in Bush vs. Ware, l-' Pet. 93 , it was decided t hat he
need not go back of a grant from the general government.
These classes of constructive notice like others never
operate between the immediate parAes, but only between
a purchaser and some prior party claiming an interest
I Pomeroy Eq. Jur. sec. 63 ; Wade on ',oAce, p. 143.
Theyr seev:m to operate as by estopple and negligpence.
If a third party is in possession or a title in-
strument recites a fact, it is ,;ross negligence for the
purchaser or incumibrancer not to follow up the clue,
which he has discovered. Therefore he mill not be
heard to deny the interest of the third party.
But
Notice to Agents.
eonstructive notice in that class of cases where an
agent has actual knowledge is a question that has been
much mooted and discussed by text-writers and judges
both in this country and England. There is a great di-
versity of opinion as to the principles of law on Jhich
it rests. Many writers insist that it is not construc-
tive notice at all, but imputed notice. 'Me distinc-
tions that they draw are refined and scholarly, yet to
an ordinary lawyer they only tend to confuse the law and
involve him in hopeless confusion.
There -iere attempts in England as early as the
seventeenth century to lay down a rule, but oring to the
poor reporting, it is almost impossible to find out what
they did. decide.
The cases of Lowther vs. Carlton, 2 Atk. 242;
Warrick vs. Warrick, 3 Atk. 294 ; and Le Ileve vs. Le
11eve, 3 Atk. 648, decided by Lord Hardwick, laid down
the rule, that only such knowledge of the agent effects
the principle as is acquired in the same transaction.
This rule was law in England until the decision of Desser
vs. Norwood, 17. C. B. (Iu.S.) 466, and Rowland vs. Hart,
L. R. 6 (lh. App. 678, aboit twenty-five years ago when
Hardwick was overruled. So now the rule is that if
the agent, at the time of the transaction, has knowledge
of any prior lien, trust or fraud, affecting the subject
matter, no matter how obtained, his principle is effected
thereby. If he acquired it before the ptrchase, the
fact that he retains it will depend on the circumstances
of the case.
The doctrine seems to rest on the rule of law, that
what knowledge the agent has of the subject matter of
the transaction, he is bound to disclose it to his
principal except where it would be a breach of profes-
sional confidence reposed in him by another. This
rule is the one followed in the United States Supreme
Court.
The Distilled Spirits case, 17. Wall. 3)U.
our state courts there is a conflict as to what the rule
is. The courts of Pennsylvania follow the Hardwick
rule. Bracken vs. h-iiller, 4 W. & S. 110. In New
York the rule is laid down in Holden vs. U. Y. & E. Bk.
72 I. Y. 286, a case in which a bank was held bound by
knowledge obtained by its president when he was not
acting in such capacity.
In the late case of Slatterly vs. Schnanneck, 44
HIn,. 7', it was held that by the rule in Holden case,
A4t; a holder of a mortgage would be bound by knowledge
imparted to his agent if the knowledr,,e was present in
the mind of the agent at time of transaction. The re-
fore the rule in New York seems to be the same as the
late rule in Enland and United States.
The other states are more or less divided as to
which is the true rule.
Concl us ion.
Though at time the application of the rules which
govern constructive notice, works seeming hardship and
injustice, yet we have but to remmiber that it has for
its foundation a broad principle of public policy and
protection to innocent third parties, and much of its
seeming hardship and injustice will vanish.
True the party that suffers is not alkiays the one
really in fault, but in a majority of the cases where
this doctrine is applied to the detriment of an apparent
innocent party, if the surrounding circumstances be
examined, it will be found that the sufferer was not
quite as diligent and careful as he should have been.
There will continually appear some seeming insignificant
fact, wich if followed up will show some want of cau-
tion or diligence, some neglect of duty, or some desire
to gain a little advantagre over an unsuspecting neipghbor.
If the doctrine was not applied to these cases, the hard-
ship and injustice would be much more patent.
There+ore, my conclusion is, that the rules which
govern constructive notice are as fair and equitable
as any rules can be, which have for their object equal
justice and the govermment of a selfish people.

